Can Gilt Yields Stay Low and is it now the turn of Equities?
At the start of 2011, 10 year gilts were yielding 3.3% and it seemed a safe bet that yields would rise markedly during the year. Interest rates were pegged at 0.5%, the rate of inflation was forecast to exceed 5% and it was clear that any slow-down in growth would be met with a new round of “quantitative easing.” A rising gold price showed a distrust of financial assets, especially those which were vulnerable to long term inflation, while Sterling continued to languish. This was expected to continue.
Instead, and despite all these forecasts proving to be correct, gilt yields tumbled. 10 year yields reached 2% while 30 year yields, 4.5% at the start of the year, fell close to 3%. The Barclays gilt index returned 17.4% (12% adjusted for inflation) while the indexed-linked index returned 12.5% (7.4% in real terms). The undated 3½% War Loan, which had traded as low as 20 in late 1974, reached 98 for an annualised return over 37 years of 22%, without reinvestment of income. Admittedly, the annualised capital return adjusted for inflation has averaged -1.4% but would have been handsomely compensated for by a generous yield of 17.5%. At the time, with the rate of inflation set to reach 25% at the end of 1975 having been higher during the year, it looked anything but generous.
It is easy to dismiss the extraordinary performance of the gilt market as an irrational “bubble” with expensive valuations having become even more expensive. This is a popular view and may very well prove to be correct; after all, the bubble in the technology sector went on inflating long after the sceptics called the top but they were right in the end. The rise in gilt yields to nearly 2.4% for ten year issues has been hailed by many as the start of a major bear market. Still, those of us who were bearish of gilts last year were painfully wrong and shouldn’t dismiss the few bulls as reckless but lucky.
The favourite argument of the bears is that the price of gilts and the bonds of other governments have been massively distorted by quantitative easing, whereby the Bank of England has bought or plans to buy £325bn of gilts with created money. This has bid prices up simply through demand exceeding supply. However, higher prices should have encouraged selling, especially with the long term threat of Central Banks reversing their purchases. This didn’t happen and those who held on to their bonds were proved right.
It seems inconceivable that yields could go lower still but the example of Japan, where yields are 1%, shows that it is possible. Admittedly, inflation there is sub-zero, the currency has been strong and the supply of domestic savings ample so circumstances are very different. Still, so relentlessly profitable has it been to invest in gilts over 37 years, with gilt returns exceeding equity returns over 25 years, that valuations could be carried to even higher levels before they reverse. The falling rate of inflation, now back to 3.6% and expected to go below 2%, is a positive factor as is the steady fall in the government’s fiscal deficit. This will reduce the issuance of gilts over time and compensate for the eventual reversal of quantitative easing. However, the market tends to anticipate, not follow falls in inflation, as it did in 1975, 2011 and on many occasions in between. The supply of gilts may diminish but that of US, Japanese, European or other bonds isn’t, which will help satisfy any excess UK demand.
In the latest issue of Barclays’ annual Equity – Gilt study, they argue that the problems in the Eurozone have funnelled investor demand into countries with the economic flexibility provided by monetary independence. That demand has been inflated since the late 1990s by an increase in the structural demand for “risk-free” assets that is not likely to be corrected in the next few years. The increase comes from demographic trends and by the phenomenal growth of reserve assets in emerging economies, notably China. From 2002-7, growing demand and improving fiscal positions led to a squeeze on the market for safe assets which turned into a crunch in 2008. Fiscal deficits rose but other “safe” assets, such as Southern European sovereign bonds and “triple-A” housing related debt disappeared even faster.
Barclays point out that, in due course, the supply of safe assets will increase as US agency and Eurozone debt return to safe haven status, deficits in the US and elsewhere continue, quantitative easing is reversed and the accumulation of reserves by emerging countries slows or stops. At that point, yields will rise and countries which have failed to curb their deficits will need to take urgent action if they are not to follow Southern Europe.
An alternative explanation is to argue that a major bear market in government bonds has already started but, instead of affecting all markets at the same time, they are being picked off one by one while the party in the core countries continues. The precedent for this in equity markets was the “nifty-fifty” market in the US in the 1960s in which a small number of companies deemed to be high quality continued to flourish while the broader market languished. Eventually, the nifty fifty fell abruptly.
The conclusion for bond investors is that yields are more unattractive than ever, whilst that does not necessarily mean that the market is about to crash; our view is that Gilt yields are moving higher. Investors in corporate credit, whether investment grade or high yield, should appreciate that future terms could be materially affected by higher government yields. It is prudent to stick to relatively short durations and higher yielding spreads relative to the risk.
After 25 years in which gilts have out-performed equities, equity investors can look forward to a reversal of that trend. In the very long term, equities have out-performed by an average 4% per annum in compensation for the higher risk and volatility; reversing the last 25 years would mean equities nearly trebling in value relative to bonds. Investors in government bonds, who have done so well by ignoring the siren voices of the bears, may not need to panic but they should remember a sobering lesson from history. The 3½% War Loan which could have been bought at 20 in late 1974 was not issued at that price; it was issued at par during the First World War. In 1932, it was trading so far above par that the government was able to force a cut in the coupon from 5% to 3½% by threatening redemption. Anyone who bought the bond in 1946 when it was still trading above par would have lost 96% of their capital in real terms in the next 28 years.
Max King,
Investment Strategist
21 March 2012

